To examine the potential bottlenecks in supply, this paper looks at the labor and material requirements to build houses, focusing discussion on an additional 500,000 units. This figure has several advantages: Starts in the second quarter of 1971 were at a rate about 500,000 higher than those in the last two years; thus data developed from this increment may throw some light on the recent buildup. Furthermore, the rate of. 2.5 million units, which has been used at times as a desirable target, would mean a further increase of about 500,000 units over the level of the second quarter. But this figure is used only as a measuring rod for developing labor and material requirements and figures based on it can be adjusted easily to some other total.
foreseen, questions would have arisen about the real resource requirements to build 2 million units and about their availability to the housing industry. To examine the potential bottlenecks in supply, this paper looks at the labor and material requirements to build houses, focusing discussion on an additional 500,000 units. This figure has several advantages: Starts in the second quarter of 1971 were at a rate about 500,000 higher than those in the last two years; thus data developed from this increment may throw some light on the recent buildup. Furthermore, the rate of. 2.5 million units, which has been used at times as a desirable target, would mean a further increase of about 500,000 units over the level of the second quarter. But this figure is used only as a measuring rod for developing labor and material requirements and figures based on it can be adjusted easily to some other total.
The Historical Perspective
The rapid rise in starts from early 1970 is but one example of several dramatic increases, demonstrated in Price behavior during past rapid buildups of housing starts has varied markedly. As measured by the Boeckh construction cost index for residential structures, the expansions in 1954 and 1958 were accomplished with essentially stable or declining relative prices for new homes. As discussed in more detail below, the Boeckh index tends to overstate the "true" increase in construction costs. Nevertheless, it declined 1 percent during the 1954 expansion in housing starts, and continued to do so There are several reasons for these differences in price behavior. For one thing, the 1954 and 1958 buildups were the smallest of the four. Furthermore, they were set against high or rising unemployment in both the economy as a whole and construction taken by itself. By contrast, the 1967 expansion in starts came at a time of extremely tight labor markets in the aggregate and in construction. While the 1949 expansion took place during a period of rising unemployment in general, nonresidential construction was expanding markedly, and most likely affected adversely the supply of skilled labor on which housebuilding could draw. As seen below, the supply of manpower to residential construction is sensitive to conditions in the labor markets for both the economy as a whole and total construction.
Slack in aggregate and construction labor markets has characterized the 1970-71 expansion. From the first quarter of 1970 through the second quarter of 1971, the Boeckh index rose 2.4 percent in excess of the private nonfarm deflator, although allowance for the overestimate in the Boeckh index would lower this figure somewhat. While more time is needed for the full effect on construction costs, it does appear that the current buildup in houses will be accompanied by an increase in their relative prices, in contrast to the experience of 1954 and 1958. This increase reflects the recent large wage settlements in the building trades and the higher prices of lumber and plywood. This paper considers in detail the labor, material, and mortgage requirements for building houses and contrasts these requirements with available supplies. The figures presented are projections, not unqualified predictions. They estimate labor and material requirements assuming that units are built with existing technology. If a particular input is in inelastic supply, an increase in demand will raise its price and induce someone-a homebuilder or someone else-to reduce his demand and use an appropriate substitute. A prediction would attempt to take account of these effects with appropriate demand and supply elasticities. The value of the projections presented below is in identifying areas where large increases in demand might run into supply bottlenecks.
Labor Requirements
Labor requirements to build 500,000 housing units are developed by occupation. The basic data come from surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of on-site manhour requirements per $1,000 of construction cost, by occupation and type of construction.' Extensive surveys on labor requirements were conducted in the early sixties. The BLS is currently engaged in updating these surveys and new data from a survey of singlefamily construction in 1969 have just become available. Recent data for multifamily construction are not available. In fact no survey of apartment construction as such was conducted. Consequently, labor requirements for multifamily structures are based on data for college dormitory construction. A comparison of the two surveys for single-family construction indicates that, with appropriate allowances for changes in productivity and prices, labor requirements derived from the two agree quite closely.
The use of the data on manhour requirements calls for judgments about the distribution of units by type, location, and size. Judgments must also be made about the increases in labor productivity and construction costs over the years since the original surveys. On the basis of recent experience, 55 percent of the half-million starts, or 275,000 units, are assumed to be singlefamily houses, with the remaining 225,000 units in multifamily structures. These declines in the amount of real house per housing unit may be a reflection of the introduction of several new programs designed to help families of low and moderate income to buy or rent new housing. Subsidized starts have expanded rapidly in the last few years, and were up from 14 percent of total starts in 1969 to 30 percent in 1970. Some further advance is expected, but the buildup in all starts should mean a constant or slightly declining share for subsidized starts.
The recent drop in the amount of real house per start could also reflect income and price effects. However, given plausible estimates of income and price elasticities, only a slower rate of increase, not an actual decline, is explainable. From 1967 to 1970 the adjusted construction cost index for residential structures rose 16 percent while the GNP consumption deflator rose just over 13 percent, for an increase in the relative price of structures of 2.9 percent. During the same time per capita real disposable income rose 7.9 percent. Most estimates of price and income elasticities of the demand for housing put both in the vicinity of 1 to 1.5 in absolute value.4 These figures pointed to an increase in the amount of house per start of 5 to 7.5 percent. requirements for total private nonfarm starts by multiplying labor requirements for the 500,000 starts by the ratio of total starts to 500,000 units. Second, it is not at all obvious that further increases in starts will follow the most recent pattern; they may well revert to longer-run patterns. In any case, the two sets of weightings lead to very similar results.
3. See discussion of this construction cost index below. 4. See Henry Aaron, "Income Taxes and Housing," American Economic Review, Vol. 60 (December 1970), p. 799, and Frank de Leeuw, "The Demand for Housing: A Re-With figures on the size of units one can compute the construction cost of 500,000 units in 1970 dollars. However, to use the BLS survey data on labor requirements, these construction costs were deflated to the year of the relevant BLS survey by indexes based on the Boeckh measures for residences and apartments. These are input cost indexes, calculated by averaging prices for material inputs and labor wage rates. Increases in either material prices or wage rates will cause such an index to rise. However, increases in labor productivity or in the efficiency of material handling are not reflected in reductions in it. In essence these indexes assume that labor productivity and material handling procedures are stagnant. While the Boeckh indexes make some allowance for improved labor efficiency, other evidence suggests that the allowance is inadequate.
For the period 1962-69 the average annual increase in the Boeckh index for residences is 1.8 percentage points higher than that in the Census Bureau's hedonic price index for new houses. The hedonic price index assumes the price of a house can be estimated by the price of its components. To estimate the inflation in construction costs, a no-inflation price is estimated using base year prices but current year specifications of the components. The figure of 1.9 percent was used to adjust all labor requirements. Changes in labor requirements and in efficiency may differ for specific skills. Changes in construction techniques or in the characteristics of a typical house may alter the occupation mix of labor. Thus greater efficiency would mean that fewer bricklayers are needed to do the same work but more extensive use of brick in a typical house would increase the need for bricklayers and slow the reduction in labor requirements. Separate rates of decline in labor requirements for each skill class could have been extrapolated from the two studies on single-family house construction. Such a procedure was not followed for several reasons. It was not known whether similar trends applied to the construction of multifamily units and it seemed dangerous to extrapolate on the basis of only two observations. Relative to the 1.9 percent figure, the single-family survey data show a slightly faster decline in total skilled labor requirements as compared with unskilled labor. Thus the estimates presented below may overestimate skilled labor requirements. By specific skills, labor requirements for cement finishers, sheet metal workers, painters, and plumbers have declined most rapidly, while labor requirements for electricians and operating engineers have declined the least. Tables 1 and 2 hours and the underlying manhour requirements from which it was derived. While the data in Table 1 are in terms of thousands of manhours, most recent estimates of hours worked per year per construction worker suggest that they are also good approximations for the number of men necessary to supply these labor requirements, but not the number of jobs. In a special study the BLS examined the work experience of individual construction workers from union health and welfare fund records in four metropolitan areas, Detroit, Omaha, Milwaukee, and Southern California.8 As Table 3 indicates, all workers in skilled occupations averaged about 1,000 hours of work throughout the year.
Other evidence suggests that while a full-time position in construction involves over 1,800 hours of work per year, construction workers average only 1,000 hours of construction work per year. From 1960 to 1967 employment in contract construction times hours of work per week times 8. The advantage of these data is that they measure the experience of specific workers. A disadvantage is that they pertain only to work that was subject to the collective bargaining agreement; construction work not covered, due to type or location of work, is not included. The quality of the data also depends on employer compliance and completeness. Data were collected for 1966 and 1967 and may reflect the general slowdown in construction activity at that time. construction labor force, as indicated by the large coefficient on the A U variable. There appears to be a large group of men with construction skills and with high mobility who move in and out of construction in response to job opportunities elsewhere. As labor markets in general tighten, these previously unemployed construction workers find work in other industries; as labor markets loosen, the ease of entry into construction (work forces are being continually formed as old projects are finished and new ones started) results in an increase in unemployment in construction. The coefficient very close to unity on the CE variable reveals that the increases in construction employment that have occurred have attracted labor into the sector almost man for man. This is another indication of the wide dispersion of construction skills and the mobility of these workers. Once these directly induced movements of labor have been accounted for, there is a further substantial flow of manpower into and out of construction in response to changes in other job opportunities. These people presumably have construction skills and would accept construction jobs.
The availability of skilled labor to residential construction is quite sensitive to labor market conditions in construction as a whole. For several reasons-less favorable wages and fringe benefits, shorter duration of jobs, and others-homebuilders have often been forced to accept poorly trained workmen or to find and train new workmen. But they have adapted to their unfavorable position in the manpower line in a way that, given the current labor market situation in both the whole economy and construction, suggests that the residential construction work force could be expanded rapidly and without too much trouble.
Responding to their shortages of skilled workers and their need to train new workers, homebuilders have developed a dual labor force in which a crew of highly skilled workers-keymen-is used to supervise jobs while transitory workmen are hired and trained as needed. Dunlop and Mills suggest that the task of training a man to do non-key man's work on a homebuilding site is not necessarily long and difficult. Homebuilders often assert their ability to train a good carpenter or machinery operator within a few months. Such training is usually informal, consisting of on-the-job instruction by a more skilled mechanic and work experience. In periods of labor shortage in construction home builders hire and train many persons.10
Homebuilders are able to engage in such hiring and training because their work sites are often unorganized or poorly policed by union business agents. Unionization in construction as a whole has been put at between 60 and 70 percent. Industry observers estimate that for single-family construction unionization is perhaps one-half that in total construction. The ability of a homebuilder to retain his keymen is dependent upon labor market conditions in construction as a whole. When construction labor markets are tight, keymen are attracted to other types of construction with higher pay and longer projects.
Because of their adjustment to past labor market conditions, homebuilders are currently in a quite favorable manpower position. Aggregate unemployment and unemployment in construction have both increased markedly from their low levels in 1969. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for private wage and salary workers reporting construction as the industry of their last job averaged 10.7 percent for the first six months of 1971, as contrasted with a rate of 6 percent for the year 1969. On a seasonally adjusted basis, employment in contract construction during the first half of 1971 was 3,246,000, a drop of 190,000 from employment in 1969.11 Data from the household survey, covering individuals without regard to where they work, showed 375,000 unemployed carpenters and construction craftsmen in January 1971. This was an increase of 194,000 over the same figure for 1969. By July 1971 the number of unemployed carpenters and craftsmen had declined to 181,000, still an excess of 122,000 over the comparable figure for 1969. The number of unemployed construction laborers followed a similar trend, with an excess over 1969 of 118,000 in January and 34,000 in July.
In an attempt to assess the availability of skilled manpower, estimates of total manhours in construction, by skills, were derived for 1969 and 1970 in a manner analogous to that used to obtain the manpower estimates for 500,000 housing units; that is, figures on real construction activity and 11. Contract construction refers to private establishments performing construction activity-new, maintenance and repair (SIC 15-17). It excludes government agencies engaged in construction activity, operative builders, and force account workers. Operative builders are those primarily engaged in construction on their own account for sale rather than as contractors. In 1967 operative builders had 72,305 employees, compared with 3,341,452 for contract construction. Force account construction is performed by an establishment primarily engaged in some other business, with its own employees and for its own use. on-site labor requirements were used to estimate manhours in total construction for selected skills.12 Table 4 This drop in real nonresidential activity, reinforced presumably by increasing productivity, has lowered total employment in contract construction despite the resurgence of homebuilding. Given mid-1971 levels of real nonresidential activity, the increase in total construction employment by 220,000 required for an additional 500,000 housing starts would raise total construction employment merely to 1969 levels. The weakness of the overall labor market would make such an expansion quite feasible.
The estimates in Table I 36.4 percent and those in the South 38.1 percent. To assess possible regional labor shortages requires data on total construction activity by region, but the only such data available report construction activity authorized in permit-issuing places. Table 5 lists the changes in the value of permitauthorized construction from January-May of 1969 to January-May 1971. While these figures do not include public nonresidential construction, they suggest that construction manpower can be expected to be available in the Northeast, North Central, and Western regions of the country, and, depending on the geographical mobility of workers, may be in relatively short supply in the South. Taken together these figures suggest that manpower is currently available for sustaining the level of housing starts at 2 million units and for facilitating a further expansion. Should nonresidential construction or aggregate activity advance substantially, the supply of manpower to residential construction could be put in jeopardy.
In are still below those in the last half of 1970 and well below their peak of $24.6 billion in the third quarter of 1969. Even more optimistic forecasts of GNP growth do not reverse the picture of prolonged depressed activity. So long as aggregate unemployment remains high, the supply of labor to construction in general will be ample. If commercial construction remains at depressed levels, the supply of skilled manpower to homebuilders will be easy and they will have no trouble in holding their keymen.
If, however, the new economic program announced by President Nixon in August 1971 has an immediate large stimulative effect on employment, the supply of manpower to residential construction could be adversely affected. A drop much below 5 percent in the aggregate unemployment rate not only would make it difficult to hire labor to build 2.5 million units, but might also lead to shortages simply in maintaining a 2 million unit rate.
Material Requirements
To what extent would the pressures implicit in building an increment of 500,000 housing units force up the prices of construction materials? How would this affect the selling prices of houses?
The 1963 input-output structure of the American economy was used to identify industries that sold large proportions of their output to residential construction. The construction of 500,000 housing units gives rise to demand for additional materials not only by the construction industry but also by industries that supply it. To analyze these total requirements, indus-tries were ranked by the ratio of total requirements of residential construction to their total output. Table 6 lists the industries in which more than 5 percent of total output is attributable to the requirements of residential construction. From the first column, which reveals the dependency of particular industries on homebuilding, it is seen to be a primary market for lumber and wood, stone and clay, and fabricated metal products (primarily metal sanitary ware, plumbing fittings and brass goods, heating equipment, and metal doors, sash, and trim). From the second column, indicating the dependence of residential construction on these industries, lumber and wood, stone and clay, and fabricated metal products again appear to be most important, accounting for over 43 percent of material inputs.
What effect would building 500,000 more housing units have on the price and quantity of these material inputs? To answer this question data are presented on recent price and quantity behavior of selected materials. Source: Construction Review, selected issues, Tables E-2 and P-1. Relative prices are calculated by dividing the wholesale price index for the material by the wholesale price index for all industrial commodities. These calculations use the group index, except for iron and steel, whose inidex was taken as the simple average of structural shapes, reinforcing bars, galvanized sheets, nails, hardware, and steel for buildings. trial commodities. The relative price of plumbing fixtures has risen slowly over time with little relation to changes in output; if anything, it rose faster in years when output fell. The relative price of paint has followed movements in output since 1968. The relative price of iron and steel products fell slowly through 1968 and has risen since then in the face of declining output. Cement prices were essentially stable from 1966 through 1968 and have risen since then. Relative prices of other materials, heating equipment, and clay products have been essentially constant, even in the face of large changes in output. The relative price of gypsum goods is falling even as output is rising; this price decline is concentrated in the price of wallboard, which has dropped substantially since 1968.
Due to the normal lags in construction, the surge in housing starts in 1967 carried over into homebuilding construction in 1968 as well. The attendant substantial increases in output of material inputs, which increased an average of 10.8 percent, are shown in Figure 2 . Only for plumbing fixtures, gypsum, and paint were price advances in excess of general inflation and the increase in the relative price of gypsum was only 0.1 percent. Most materials appear to be available in quite elastic supplies.
The price behavior of materials in earlier periods of rapid expansion in homebuilding also supports the conclusion of generally elastic supplies. In 1959, with large increases in the output of materials (apart from iron and steel, output increases averaged over 14 percent), the only advances in relative prices were in plumbing fixtures and clay products. Relative prices of all the other materials declined. Experience in 1963 was a bit more mixed, with relative prices of plumbing fixtures, clay products, and gypsum rising The largest increase was for clay products and was only 0.7 percentage point.
In summary, if one can extrapolate from the record, Figure 2 suggests that, abstracting from price increases due to general inflation, the price of plumbing fixtures can be expected to rise modestly; those of cement and iron and steel may increase slightly more; and that of paint will rise with the increase in residential construction expenditures. Other materials, however, appear to be available in fairly elastic supply.
Lumber and Plywood Requirements
Lumber and plywood requirements for building 500,000 housing units were developed in much the same way as labor requirements. With the avail- able data for 1968 on the amount of lumber and plywood used by size and type of dwelling unit, calculations were made of the amount of these materials per unit and per thousand dollars of construction cost (see Table 7 ).
To use these figures is to assume that the amount of lumber and plywood embodied in each dollar of dwelling unit will remain at its 1968 level. Greatly augmented demand, however, could raise prices and induce some substitution away from lumber and plywood to other building materials. But, as indicated earlier, these figures are intended as projections, not predictions. Recent figures on lumber and plywood use appear to be in line with longerrun trends. Considered in relation to each thousand dollars of construction cost, lumber has shown little consistent movement over the sixties. Plywood has followed a rising trend, although observers feel that much of its potential substitution for other building materials has been accomplished and only more limited areas of substitution remain.14 Given the lumber and plywood requirements per unit and the assumptions, laid out above, about the size and type of housing, total requirements for 500,000 housing units are 4.3 billion board feet of lumber and 1.6 billion square feet of plywood. It is not surprising that these numbers represent major increases in output of both materials, for residential construction is a major market for both. From 1962 to 1967 it accounted for an estimated 37 percent of total lumber consumption and probably a similar proportion of plywood consumption.15 The lumber to build 500,000 more Table 8 The National Association of Home Builders estimates that lumber and wood products account for about 20 percent of the construction cost of a single-family house. A 15 percent increase in the prices of these components would mean an increase in total construction costs of 3 to 4 percent. The effect on the selling price of a house would presumably be less-perhaps 2.5 to 3.5 percent. Certain costs, such as architectural fees and other commissions, would increase as a markup over construction cost, but others, such as land prices, need not rise in response to lumber prices.
PLYWOOD PRICES
Production of softwood plywood in 1970 was more than five times that in 1950, rising from 2.676 billion square feet to 13.900 billion square feet (see Table 9 ). The relative price of plywood has fallen off continuously since 1950 except for years of larger-than-average increases in output-years associated with high levels of housing starts. From 1950 to 1960 plywood output nearly tripled while relative prices dropped more than 35 percent. Since 1960 a doubling of output has been accompanied by a decline in relative prices of 13 percent.
The experience of the last few years suggests that the period of expanding output and declining prices may well be over. While output rose 12 percent The major problem involved in an expansion of both lumber and plywood production is the supply of sawtimber, particularly softwood sawtimber. The problem is not that the inventory of trees is too small but that current rates of harvesting are insufficient to meet projected increases in demand at current prices. It has been estimated that the sustainable yield of softwood sawtimber under conditions of intensive management is between 3 and 5 percent of the sawtimber inventory. With an inventory of softwood sawtimber of 2 trillion board feet on January 1, 1968, this ratio would mean a sustained yield of 60 billion to 100 billion board feet. These figures on prospective yields are substantially above current rates of harvesting and would require more intensive management of timber lands if they are to be realized on a sustained basis.
Management of timber lands refers to activities such as culling dead trees, pruning and thinning, treatment of disease, seeding and reforesting after cutting, and the maintenance of access roads. More intensive management permits higher rates of growth and thus higher levels of harvesting while the existing inventory is maintained. But it requires the input of real resources, which will necessitate higher prices. Tables 10 and 11 show the distribution of commercial forest land and sawtimber inventories and cut by ownership. Forests cover 762 million acres out of a total land area in the United States of 2.3 billion acres. Of the total, 235 million acres are classified as unproductive because of low yield; 16 million acres are reserved for park and wilderness areas and are not available for harvesting.
Private holdings are harvested most intensively, with a cut-to-inventory ratio in 1962 of 3.3 percent. Private holdings were supplying 63 percent of the softwood cut while holding only 34 percent of the softwood inventory. Softwood inventories are largely concentrated on national forest land, which is being harvested least intensively.16 In 1962 softwood timber harvest on all national forest land was only 0.9 percent of the inventory of sawtimber, as contrasted with a harvest rate of 3.7 percent on forest industry land. Indirect evidence suggests that the yield on national forest land has risen to about 1.2 percent of inventory, while the yield on forest industry land has remained at about 3.7 percent. If the former could be raised to match the latter, an additional 26 billion board feet per year would be forthcoming. While such an increase is problematic at best, the Forest Service has stated that "under an accelerated management program that is well balanced in all respects, we could increase timber harvests on the National Forests over 7 billion board feet in the next decade."17 The major problem leading the Forest Service to restrict the harvest on its land is inadequate financing for reforestation, timber stand improvement, and other elements of intensive management. In 1961 the President proposed a ten-year development plan for national forests; in 1970 timber stand improvement and reforestation work were budgeted at 29.5 percent of the level proposed nine There is, however, some dispute over how soon increased harvesting of national forest land could begin. Forest industry spokesmen believe that accelerated cutting could begin immediately. The Forest Service is more cautious and has indicated its unwillingness to accelerate cutting before continuing levels of financing are assured and intensive management begins to produce higher yields. It is interesting to note that while projected workload factors for the Forest Service for timber stand improvement and tree planting and seeding rose 51 percent in the 1971 federal budget, they dropped 22 percent in the 1972 budget.
THE PRICE EFFECTS
What impact would the building of 500,000 more housing units have on lumber and plywood prices? Experience from the early and middle sixties is inappropriate for evaluating the immediate effect on prices of a large increase in demand. The expansion of lumber consumption in that period was over levels of output that had been attained in the fifties; lumber consumption in 1964-66 was at the same level as in 1955 and 1956. But the levels attained in 1968 and 1969 were higher than any others in the postwar period. It may well be that lumber consumption has reached a point at which the short-run supply curve is quite inelastic. The recent rise in starts has been accompanied by large increases in the relative prices of lumber and plywood. An additional jump in starts by 500,000 units would be expected to affect lumber and plywood prices immediately and sharply, raising them by 15 to 20 percent. However, they should moderate somewhat as suppliers respond to them with increased imports, more intensive management of existing lands, and harvesting on new lands, all of which take time to have an impact on supply. Table 12 implicitly assume that savings flows in the second half of the year will remain at the levels observed during the first half. This assumption may seem a bit implausible, especially with respect to savings flows to the thrift institu- Table 12 In summary, current high rates of savings inflows appear more than adequate to meet the $6.9 billion mortgage requirements of 500,000 housing units. Given a decline in long-term interest rates and continued federal support of mortgage markets, funds appear to be available to finance a further increase in housing starts.
Effect of Lumber Prices and

Summary and Conclusions
There should be little trouble from the supply side in sustaining a level of 2 million housing starts in the immediate future. Moreover, there is reason for optimism about the nation's ability to build another large increment of houses. Recent high rates of savings flows to commercial banks and thrift institutions have released financial constraints on homebuilding for the current period. If sustained, these flows, supplemented by aggressive action by the federal government, could finance a further substantial increase in homebuilding.
Labor and most materials appear at the moment to be readily available to homebuilders. The current expansion in homebuilding has occurred at a time of high aggregate unemployment, which works to increase the supply of labor to construction in general, and a time of reduced levels of nonresidential construction, which augments the supply of labor to homebuilding. In the aggregate the requirements for skilled workers in homebuilding appear to be matched by reductions in other forms of construction. Should there be a marked increase in either nonresidential construction or in general economic activity, the availability of labor to homebuilding will be curtailed.
The supplies of most building materials appear to be quite elastic; they expanded in 1968 as well as in earlier housing booms with relatively small movements in relative prices. Lumber and plywood are the major exceptions: As demand for them moves up with the increase in homebuilding, their prices will rise substantially.
Comments and Discussion
John Kareken: Craig Swan has given us a very plausible and optimistic assessment of the nation's ability to build 500,000 more houses a year, or 2,500,000 in total. If anything, I would say the assessment may be a shade too optimistic. For one thing, housing has already risen greatly from its 1970 average and presumably has absorbed a lot of labor in the process. The labor requirements created by the next addition of 500,000 units to housing starts may not be met quite as easily as was suggested in the paper. Another factor that may not be so favorable is the availability of mortgage money. The flow of funds into the thrift institutions in the first half of 1971 was super-phenomenal; Swan has cut this flow in half in making his projection of funds. While it looks prudent, the assumed cutback may not be large enough. The recent heavy flow of funds into the thrift institutions reflected not just a stock adjustment, but also-at least according to some people-fears about the economy. If the new economic policy alleviates those fears, that incentive for the accumulation of liquid funds will disappear.
The historical analysis revealed a striking contrast between the 1949 and the 1967 increases in housing starts, both of which caused sharp increases in costs and relative prices, and the 1954 and 1958 increases, neither of which had that effect. The 1949 and 1967 increases were larger, but other factors seem important. The ease of the 1954 and 1958 advances may suggest that we should not concern ourselves too much with smoothing house building. There must be some gains from smooth output, but if the same amount of 378 housing can be obtained over some time interval, it may not be a bad idea to build the houses when nonresidential construction is weak. In a rough way that is what our rather queer financial arrangements have so far guaranteed. The evidence that Swan has provided suggests that we may not have great cause to worry about smoothing the production of housing.
General Discussion
Nancy Teeters reported that work she had done to evaluate the reasonableness of the national housing goals revealed that the underlying demand for housing is very strong. Shifting demographic factors, primarily the large increase in the relative number of young people entering the labor force in the marriageable ages, is responsible for this demand. The demand from this source will remain strong for at least five years. Moreover, as these young people start having children, demand will shift back toward singlefamily homes, if past patterns prevail, and there may be some retreat from the relatively high demand for multifamily units that prevailed in the late 1960s.
She felt that the strong underlying demand for housing posed a policy dilemma. Swan's paper supports the informal observation that strong housing demand is usually satisfied only when business fixed investment is relatively weak. If the investment tax credit is again reinstated, the resulting increase in business fixed investment is likely to squeeze residential construction. Given the demand outlook for housing and the unsatisfactory condition of much of the existing housing stock, reinstatement of the investment tax credit may be a very poor policy choice, she concluded.
Charles Bischoff pointed out that there were several ways in which the investment tax credit might indirectly affect residential construction. He reported evidence that the investment tax credit tends to shift business capital spending toward equipment and away from nonresidential construction, other things being equal. To this extent if the real competition for resources comes from within the construction industry, the investment tax credit should not hurt housing.
Another important question has to do with the flow of funds. If the investment tax credit stimulates business capital spending more than dollar for dollar, it will tend to tighten long-term credit markets. Clearly, a loosening of funds would occur in the short run, since the tax credit would begin immediately; but its impact would have a substantial lag. In the longer run,
